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child. These things, it seems to me, are good in and of themselves. What 
makes them good, what explains their goodness, lies entirely within their 
intrinsic nature. If there are such intrinsic goods, then it appears that 
neither murphy’s nor Adams’s theory can account for them, and this is 
a strike against both theories. This is an explanandum-centred challenge 
to Adams’s and murphy’s accounts of the goodness of finite things.
Whatever the merits of this criticism, murphy has written a book very 
much worth reading. by way of conclusion, I should emphasize that the 
book contains a number of stimulating arguments beyond those I have 
sketched here. In particular, murphy offers some novel challenges for 
standard natural law theory and theological voluntarism that defenders 
of those approaches will want to consider – though whether murphy’s 
arguments will ‘settle’ the theological voluntarists as he suggests they 
should (p. 132) remains to be seen.
JAmeS D. mADDeN
Benedictine College
Charles Taliaferro, Jil Evans. The Image in Mind: Theism, Naturalism, 
and the Imagination. Continuum, 2011.
The Image in Mind: Theism, Naturalism, and the Imagination is an attempt 
to bring a  previously underemphasized consideration to the forefront 
of the theism-naturalism debate: the comparative aesthetic value of 
opposed worldviews. The authors, Charles Taliaferro and Jil evans, 
endeavour to shift our attention away from the more directly evidential 
questions that currently dominate the theism vs. naturalism literature 
toward such questions as ‘What is beautiful or ugly, deep or superficial, 
extravagant or empty, illuminating or stultifying about these images’ 
(p. 1)? Whether naturalism can account for the emergence of specifically 
aesthetic values is a theme tracked throughout the book, but Taliaferro 
and evans are equally interested in the prospects of naturalistic accounts 
of the emergence of ‘ ... life, sentience, consciousness, free will, and moral, 
aesthetic, and religious experience through non-purposive, impersonal 
forces’ (p. 3). They offer substantial discussions of each of these issues, 
and in doing so they employ an aesthetic mode of evaluation. Despite its 
relative brevity, The Image in Mind competently treats this broad sweep 
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of issues, but Taliaferro and evans’ most important contribution is the 
proposal of a  novel, aesthetically based, methodology for evaluating 
competing philosophical perspectives.
many analytic philosophers are likely to be scandalized by the 
suggestion of such an aesthetic methodology. Taliaferro and evans set 
out to correct this implicit, and largely unreflective, mistrust of aesthetic 
standards for philosophizing in chapter 1. marilyn mcCord Adams 
has also suggested that aesthetic evaluations should not be so neatly 
quarantined from supposedly more properly truth-oriented modes 
of philosophizing. According to her diagnosis, analytic philosophy’s 
dismissal of aesthetic criteria is an  unnecessary consequence of post-
positivist attempts to preserve the objectivity of ethics by contrasting it 
with the supposedly properly subjective realm of aesthetics. (See marilyn 
mcCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell university Press, 1999), pp.  129-132.) Taliaferro and evans, 
however, contend that our recent dismissal of aesthetic criteria runs 
deeper than a  hangover from the excesses of logical positivism in the 
last century, i.e., it is part and parcel of a general denigration of the role 
imagination plays in perception, agency, and rationality by even self-
avowed anti-positivists that can be traced back to a  tension present at 
the very beginnings of modern philosophy. They contrast the Cambridge 
Platonists with other early modern philosophers, mainly Descartes 
and Hobbes, and find that their attitudes toward the imagination are 
particularly instructive inasmuch as the former, and not the latter, take it 
that ‘imagination can provide a natural means to make explicit and give 
shape to ideals that are not immediately observed ... ’ and thereby ‘ ... 
provide an arena in which to explore the good, the true, and the beautiful’ 
(p. 13). This is a stream of early modern thought that the authors trace 
through Hume, Kant and Coleridge, but they note that this high view of 
imagination is called into question by Wittgenstein’s and ryle’s influential 
arguments against private language and dualism respectively. Taliaferro 
and evans argue that Wittgenstein’s private language argument, whatever 
its broader value might be, fails to undermine the role of imagination in 
inquiry, because it does not actually establish that humans lack mental 
images entirely and Wittgenstein himself employs an  imaginative 
method in developing the argument in the Philosophical Investigations 
(pp. 19-21). likewise, ryle bases his case against the Cartesian theory of 
mind by appealing to certain unfortunate images, e.g. ‘the ghost in the 
machine’, that he believes dualism foists on us (pp. 21-23).
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According to Taliaferro and evans, there is no reason to doubt our 
common intuition that imagination plays a significant role in perception, 
but they go on to argue that imagination plays a much more active role 
in our knowledge gathering by (a) providing prima facie evidence that 
a certain state of affairs is possible; (b) making explicit what is implicit in 
our other beliefs; (c) providing a means of pursuing specifically ethical 
and philosophical inquiry by way of the method of thought experiment; 
and (d) allowing us to make connections between evidence and challenges 
to evidence (pp. 24-30). The reader must keep in mind that the notion of 
‘imagination’ in play is not a mere free-association of ideas, but rather ‘ ... 
the proposed use of imagination in testing theism and naturalism is one 
of enlargement of perspective ... rather than substitution’ (p. 31). That is, 
evidentially significant imagination takes us beyond, yet is still grounded 
in, the data; it is a sort of picturing that allows us to put a body of evidence 
into a larger or more complete context that fills in the inevitable gaps and 
limitations in any given body of data. The aesthetic evaluation of these 
expansive images are what Taliaferro and evans believe to be evidentially 
significant, particularly with respect to the assessment of the credibility 
of theism and naturalism.
In chapter 2, Taliaferro and evans begin by articulating a  mode 
of the aesthetic evaluation for expansive imagination that is integral 
even to our scientific inquiries. In particular, ‘In science, as in art, one 
highly valued aesthetic feature is a cognitive, affective completeness or 
unity’ (p.  39). Human beings ‘long for unity and wholeness’, but our 
ordinary experiences of the material world are fragmentary or otherwise 
incomplete. The impetus for inquiry is then our movement to discover 
a broader unity or wholeness that puts our particular experiences into 
a  coherent picture. That is, we move to complete our fragmentary 
experience by developing an  expansive image. This picture, however, 
is not merely a free association or substitution of one idea for another, 
but a fitting expansion. Whether an  image is indeed fitting to a  set of 
data becomes an evaluative criterion not only in visual arts, but inquiry 
in general, natural science included: ‘These examples from science and 
the arts demonstrate that in the pursuit to bring the urge for wholeness 
to fruition, wholeness is achieved by images. Whether or not we are 
convinced by the images lies in how we believe the image is constructed’, 
i.e. whether the image is fitting (p.  43). That is, ‘The link between art 
and science has been recognized insofar as the criteria for accepting 
scientific theories [e.g., simplicity] may be cast in aesthetic terms’ (p. 46), 
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and Taliaferro and evans use Darwin’s quasi-aesthetic concerns that 
helped to lead him to an evolutionary image as a confirmatory case for 
this claim. This is not to say that aesthetic considerations are primary in 
scientific inquiry, but only that ‘beauty and aesthetic considerations in 
general have (as a matter of fact) impacted scientific work, and that many 
elements (imagination and creativity) that enter into artistic practice 
have their analogue in scientific investigations’, and presumably there 
will likewise be evaluative analogies (ibid.).
At this point in the argument the notion of emergence, i.e., the coming 
to be of a sui generis form or way of being from a prior or more fundamental 
form, becomes crucial for Taliaferro and evans. The emergence of 
novel forms has vast plasticity in the visual arts (and presumably other 
mediums alike). Nevertheless, even in this context emergence is not 
without its limits: ‘but it is important to realize that the emergent entities 
are grounded in something that is identifiable; otherwise there would 
not be a  picture of metamorphosis, but a  picture of no identities or 
without intelligible identity of any kind.’ (p. 65) That is, in the visual arts, 
emergence is limited by a fittingness relation, however polymorphous it 
might be within these limitations, between the emergent form and the 
ground from which it is derived. Analogously, the fittingness between 
an emergent form and the metaphysical resources of a broad worldview 
by which we attempt to account for it then becomes the central aesthetic 
criterion by which we are to judge theism and naturalism throughout 
the remainder of The Image in Mind. Taliaferro and evans’ treatment of 
the plausibility of libertarian free will serves as a good example of how 
this method bears out. on the one hand, they take theism as the view 
that ‘offers an account of the whole cosmos in terms of a good, purposive 
Creator’ (p. 57). on the other hand, naturalism, though it may vary in 
terms of the strength of the physicalist reduction it proposes, takes the 
universe as fundamentally free of purpose or ultimate direction because 
natural science is the ultimate arbiter of truth and ‘appeals to theism or 
souls are scientifically inscrutable and thus not acceptable’ (p. 48). The 
authors then use a familiar argument from Galen Strawson to show that 
libertarian freedom is not at all plausible given a  strongly reductivist 
version of naturalism, and they argue that attempts by non-reductivist 
naturalists, e.g., unger and Searle, to give emergentist accounts of 
libertarian freedom are generally unpromising. Thus, there is not much 
of a  ‘fit’ between libertarian free will and a  naturalistic worldview. In 
theism, however, we have an image wherein freedom is much more at 
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home: ‘Consciousness and freedom do not emerge as a radical break in 
an impersonal cosmos. At the heart of reality, God is conscious and free.’ 
(p. 60) If we are inclined to take fittingness, even in an aesthetic sense, as 
a criterion for evaluation, theism would seem to have an edge.
In chapter 3 Taliaferro and evans extend their application of the 
methodology of aesthetic fit to the coming to be of a  well-ordered, 
contingent universe and the emergence of consciousness. After offering 
plausible replies to standard naturalist objections to the intelligibility of 
theism and dismissals of the significance of the ‘cosmic question’, they 
argue that, whereas theism has ready answers as to why a  contingent 
universe exists, ‘ ... naturalism is only able to give us the blunt answer 
that there is no deeper account as to why the cosmos exists or continues 
in being’ (p. 71). moreover, the authors claim that the fine-tuning of the 
physical constants of the universe that makes the emergence of living 
beings possible likewise constitutes an  aesthetically pleasing fit with 
theism, and it is difficult to say the same for naturalism. Taliaferro and 
evans argue that strict naturalists, e.g. Daniel Dennett, would have us 
‘either posit a  miracle or face the explanation from below, in which 
the intentional dissolves and is accounted by the non-intentional’ 
(p.  80). one worries, however, that Dennett’s position amounts to 
an  elimination rather than an  explanation of consciousness, and it is 
therefore untenable because ‘the reality of conscious experience is more 
foundational than the most certain posits of science’ (p. 87). moreover, 
theistic accounts of the coming to be of consciousness need not be so 
starkly ad hoc, so long as one is willing to countenance the plausibility of 
theistic evolution, according to which biologically necessary conditions 
for consciousness are the products of an evolutionary process, even if no 
ultimate scientific explanation of consciousness can be given (p. 101). In 
chapter 4 Taliaferro and evans continue their anti-reductionist program 
by arguing against naturalistic attempts to eliminate (or reduce beyond 
significance) animal minds and they argue that recognition of minds 
(both those had by humans and lower animals) entails values that do not 
fit well with naturalism.
Chapter 5 begins with the admission that the seeming occurrence 
of unredeemable evils and the apparent silence or hiddenness of God 
constitute ‘a deep philosophical and theological problem of emergence’ 
particularly for the theist (p.  149). before addressing this apparent 
misfit between theism and the reality of evil, Taliaferro and evans 
make the point that naturalism cannot account for the sense that many 
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people have that evil is not merely meaningless, but a violation or loss 
of a way things ought to have otherwise been. Since naturalism denies 
fundamental purpose as a feature of the universe, it does not fit with the 
apparent fact that ‘Tragedy is marked by lamentation and destruction, 
to say something is tragic is to recognize the value of loss’ (p. 159). As to 
whether theism, despite initial appearances, can fit with evil, Taliaferro 
and evans introduce and develop some of the standard theodicies 
appealing to natural order and free will as necessary conditions for 
the good of responsible agency. They are careful, however, to note that 
a truly satisfying account of evil for the theist must be done ‘ ... in light of 
redemption rather than justification’, i.e., the theist should seek not only 
to show how God could possibly allow certain evils, but further explain 
how he overcomes them. This task, however, draws us into the centre 
of incarnational theology and speculation about postmortem reward. 
Taliaferro and evans take up these very issues in chapter 6, in which they 
speculate regarding the use of imagination in forming a plausible picture 
of the afterlife and develop a Christus Victor theory of the atonement.
Some of the technical philosophical issues that are addressed along 
the way are dealt with a bit more quickly than some critical readers might 
prefer, but Taliaferro and evans’ treatment of these matters is suggestive 
enough that even their opponents will find much that is worthy to 
consider. This is also to be expected in a  book which straddles very 
well the line between specialized scholarship and appeal to a  broader 
readership. That being said, I have just two relatively minor points by 
way of criticism. (a) Some advocates of naturalistic emergence accounts 
of consciousness have not seen the prima facie appearance of ‘misfit’ 
between the supposedly emergent phenomena and its physical origin as 
particularly troublesome. Timothy o’Connor (see Persons and Causes 
(New York: oxford university Press, 2000), pp.  108-125) argues that 
many well-established causal relations, though they may turn out to be 
metaphysically necessary, are initially surprising or even counterintuitive. 
Some critical treatment of this particular way of defending naturalistic 
emergence would be helpful. (b) Among its many virtues, the most 
significant contribution by The Image in Mind is the development of 
the aesthetic mode of evaluation for philosophical theories. At times it 
is unclear as to how an appeal to aesthetic fit is actually distinct from 
the sort of inferences to the best explanation already quite frequently 
employed in science, philosophy, and common life. It might be the case 
that Taliaferro and evans’ point is that this ubiquitous mode of argument 
209booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
has an  irreducible aesthetic element, but I  would welcome a  more 
detailed methodological account along these lines. Do not allow these 
minor concerns to mar what is an important contribution to the existing 
literature on the theism and naturalism debate.
loGAN PAul GAGe
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David O’Connor. God, Evil, and Design: An  Introduction to the 
Philosophical Issues. Blackwell, 2008.
Given that many standard texts on the problem of evil are often too 
technical for undergraduates, this new introduction by Seton Hall’s 
David o’Connor is a welcome addition to the literature. What is more, 
it helpfully pairs a discussion of the problem of evil with consideration 
of design in nature (which discussion of the problem of evil naturally 
evokes) with the goal of seeing if an  inference to God’s existence is 
rational overall.
o’Connor admirably cajoles students into their own philosophical 
inquiry rather than passive reading. However, he (unhelpfully) asks 
students to shed their biases and pretend that they are behind a rawlsian 
veil of ignorance regarding their own religious affiliations. Judgments 
will differ, but to this reviewer it would be better for students to reflect 
upon their biases rather than pretend they do not exist. After all, if we are 
so biased that we cannot deliberate reasonably about God and evil, how 
will we be able to successfully pretend to be impartial arbiters?
God, Evil, and Design certainly wears its introductory nature on its 
sleeve. one assumes that even freshman do not need to be reminded 
twice in five pages that the great monotheistic religions are Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. o’Connor spends a  whole chapter laying 
out the basic terminology necessary for the discussion: moral versus 
natural evil, the basic properties of the God of classical theism, and 
various understandings of the relationship between faith and reason. 
Chapter three opens with eight pages explaining logical contradiction, 
an idea that could surely be explained in a paragraph. The chief culprit 
here is o’Connor’s style of providing abundant examples and thought 
experiments. While defining terms up front can be helpful, the effect is 
that the central ideas do not even begin to appear until halfway through 
chapter three.
